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Anonymity and Multi-jurisdictionality Hinder Government Control of Cyberspace

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DOI: 10.23977/jsoce.2024.060504 | Downloads: 8 | Views: 114

Author(s)

Yi Zhou 1

Affiliation(s)

1 Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

Corresponding Author

Yi Zhou

ABSTRACT

The inherent characteristics of anonymity and multi-jurisdictionality in cyberspace present significant challenges for effective government regulation and control. This essay explores how these characteristics undermine governmental efforts by examining two specific cases: cyberextortion and digital currency. In the case of cyberextortion, multi-jurisdictionality and the lack of inter-jurisdictional cooperation create substantial obstacles to law enforcement, particularly when the subject of a cyberextortion is another government of a country. For digital currencies, as represented by Bitcoin, the decentralized and anonymous nature of transactions poses significant barriers to regulation and taxation. Although governments have employed various prohibitions and regulations to try to control cyberspace, these efforts have often proven ineffective or counterproductive due to the limited reach of single-national jurisdictions and the distinctive nature of the cyberspace. Enhanced international cooperation may offer a potential path for governments seeking to regulate cyberspace, though it is unlikely to fully overcome the challenges presented by anonymity and multi-jurisdictionality.

KEYWORDS

Cyberspace; anonymity; multi-jurisdictionality

CITE THIS PAPER

Yi Zhou, Anonymity and Multi-jurisdictionality Hinder Government Control of Cyberspace. Journal of Sociology and Ethnology (2024) Vol. 6: 27-34. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/jsoce.2024.060504.

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