Education, Science, Technology, Innovation and Life
Open Access
Sign In
  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. Journal of Sociology and Ethnology
  4. Vol 7, Issue 1, 2025

The Influence of Perceived Harm on Moral Norms and Judgments

Download as PDF

DOI: 10.23977/jsoce.2025.070113 | Downloads: 3 | Views: 135

Author(s)

Yiming Yun 1

Affiliation(s)

1 School of History, Anthropology, Politics&Philosophy, Queen's University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom

Corresponding Author

Yiming Yun

ABSTRACT

This essay explores the pivotal role of perceived harm in shaping moral norms and judgments, drawing on theories such as Moral Foundations Theory, the moral-conventional distinction, and dyadic morality. Harm is universally recognized as a central component of moral condemnation, yet its perception is deeply influenced by cultural, contextual, and cognitive factors. While physical and emotional harm are often seen as morally unacceptable, abstract, symbolic, and future-based harms also play a significant role in moral reasoning. The essay examines how harm is conceptualized across different moral frameworks, including its intersection with purity, loyalty, and intentionality. Neuroscientific and cross-cultural studies are cited to illustrate the universality and variability of harm-based moral judgments. Ultimately, the essay argues that while harm is a foundational element of morality, its interpretation is shaped by cultural norms, individual differences, and cognitive processes, highlighting the complexity of moral psychology. The interplay between universal cognitive mechanisms and cultural diversity underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of how harm influences moral norms and judgments.

KEYWORDS

Perceived Harm, Moral Norms, Moral Judgments, Moral Foundations Theory, Dyadic Morality, Cross-Cultural Studies

CITE THIS PAPER

Yiming Yun, The Influence of Perceived Harm on Moral Norms and Judgments. Journal of Sociology and Ethnology (2025) Vol. 7: 88-91. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/jsoce.2025.070113.

REFERENCES

[1] Alicke, M. D. [2000]. Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological Bulletin, 126[4], 556-574.
[2] Ciaramelli, E., Muccioli, M., Làdavas, E., & di Pellegrino, G. [2007]. Selective deficit in personal moral judgment following damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2[2], 84-92.
[3] Cushman, F. [2008]. Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition, 108[2], 353-380.
[4] Decety, J., Michalska, K. J., & Kinzler, K. D. [2012]. The contribution of emotion and cognition to moral sensitivity: A neurodevelopmental study. Cerebral Cortex, 22[1], 209-220.
[5] Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. [2009]. Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96[5], 1029-1046. 
[6] Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. [2008]. The sting of intentional pain. Psychological Science, 19[12], 1260-1262.
[7] Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. [2004]. Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus, 133[4], 55-66.
[8] Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., ... & Tracer, D. [2005]. "Economic man" in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28[6], 795-815.
[9] Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P. E., Mendelovici, A., McGeer, V., & Wheatley, T. [2011]. Is morality unified? Evidence that distinct neural systems underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and disgust. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23[10], 3162-3180.
[10] Shweder, R. A., Mahapatra, M., & Miller, J. G. [1987]. Culture and moral development. In J. Kagan & S. Lamb [Eds.], The emergence of morality in young children [pp. 1-83]. University of Chicago Press.
[11] Turiel, E. [1983]. The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge University Press.
[12] Young, L., & Saxe, R. [2011]. When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains. Cognition, 120[2], 202-214.

All published work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Copyright © 2016 - 2031 Clausius Scientific Press Inc. All Rights Reserved.