Subsidies, Competition, and Capacity Allocation: Coordinating Logistics Networks for the Belt and Road Initiative
DOI: 10.23977/ieim.2026.090113 | Downloads: 5 | Views: 75
Author(s)
Xiaotong Liu 1
Affiliation(s)
1 Shandong Energy Group Co., Ltd., Jining, Shandong, 272102, China
Corresponding Author
Xiaotong LiuABSTRACT
In September 2013, President Xi proposed the Silk Road Economic Belt to foster regional collaboration, introducing a novel paradigm for international cooperation formally known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A core objective of the BRI is to reconfigure the logistics and transportation networks across participating regions to spur economic development, making the establishment of cross-regional logistics service supply chain (LSSC) cooperation highly imperative. Motivated by this, our paper investigates the impact of government interventions-specifically, subsidies and tax incentives-and horizontal supply chain competition on enterprises' willingness to participate in the BRI. By developing game-theoretic models and conducting numerical simulations, we derive several key insights. First, under a provider monopoly, an increase in government subsidies leads to a higher price for logistics service capacity, with the price growing at an accelerating rate. Second, in scenarios involving competing integrators, a higher intensity of market competition necessitates a correspondingly larger government subsidy to effectively incentivize BRI participation.
KEYWORDS
Belt and Road Initiative; Logistics Service Supply Chain; Game TheoryCITE THIS PAPER
Xiaotong Liu. Subsidies, Competition, and Capacity Allocation: Coordinating Logistics Networks for the Belt and Road Initiative. Industrial Engineering and Innovation Management (2026). Vol. 9, No. 1, 113-121. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/ieim.2026.090113.
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