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Analysis of the Opportunistic Risk Control of Star Spokesmen Based on the KMRW Model

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DOI: 10.23977/jsoce.2022.041003 | Downloads: 7 | Views: 371

Author(s)

Jiayu Sun 1, Wenli Li 2

Affiliation(s)

1 School of Finance, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang, Jiangxi, China
2 No.1 Middle School of Xinyu High-tech Industrial Development Zone, Xinyu, Jiangxi, China

Corresponding Author

Jiayu Sun

ABSTRACT

With the advent of the digital age, the role of celebrity endorsements in promoting product sales continues to expand. To cater to the trend of the new era and achieve a win-win situation in a highly competitive market, most companies adopt the marketing method of celebrity endorsements. However, due to information asymmetry, celebrity endorsements also bring moral hazards, hazards the celebrity's reputation, and seriously jeopardize the corporate reputation. Therefore, this paper analyzes the opportunism of celebrity endorsement by establishing the KMRW reputation model. The research shows that reputation can curb the opportunistic behavior of celebrity endorsers.

KEYWORDS

Information asymmetry, celebrity endorsement, moral hazard, KMRW reputation model

CITE THIS PAPER

Jiayu Sun, Wenli Li, Analysis of the Opportunistic Risk Control of Star Spokesmen Based on the KMRW Model. Journal of Sociology and Ethnology (2022) Vol. 4: 14-22. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/jsoce.2022.041003.

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