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Analysis of the Impact of Multiple Major Shareholders on Information Transparency: Based on the Perspective of Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge

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DOI: 10.23977/ferm.2023.060908 | Downloads: 40 | Views: 491

Author(s)

Min Zeng 1

Affiliation(s)

1 School of Economics, Guangxi University/China-ASEAN Institute of Financial Cooperation, Nanning, Guangxi, China

Corresponding Author

Min Zeng

ABSTRACT

The pledge of equity causes a serious deviation between the cash flow rights and voting rights of controlling shareholders, which may lead to controlling shareholders using their controlling position to harm the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and using information management to cover up their tunneling behavior, reducing the transparency of company information. This article uses data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2019 to empirically test the impact of multiple major shareholders on company information transparency under the background of controlling shareholder equity pledge. The empirical results show that controlling shareholder equity pledge can lead to a decrease in company transparency, and this phenomenon is mainly concentrated in private listed companies; When a company has multiple major shareholders, this phenomenon still exists. The findings of this article provide new and exploitable evidence for the conspiracy theory of major shareholders in listed companies.

KEYWORDS

Equity pledge, Multiple major shareholders, Information transparency

CITE THIS PAPER

Min Zeng, Analysis of the Impact of Multiple Major Shareholders on Information Transparency: Based on the Perspective of Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge. Financial Engineering and Risk Management (2023) Vol. 6: 51-61. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/ferm.2023.060908.

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