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The Subjective Status of Artificial Intelligence in Civil Law

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DOI: 10.23977/law.2023.020903 | Downloads: 16 | Views: 325

Author(s)

Zhen Dai 1

Affiliation(s)

1 Law School, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China

Corresponding Author

Zhen Dai

ABSTRACT

With the development of big data and the rapid changes in technology, artificial intelligence has gradually become involved in our daily lives, and has even become an indispensable tool for contemporary young people. At present, the forms of artificial intelligence are gradually diversifying, and in this regard, a series of related legal issues have arisen. To today's level of science and technology and the degree of robot autonomy, artificial intelligence should be the object, that is, as a civil law object, but a number of scientists have predicted that in the next ten years or even a few years, artificial intelligence can reach 80% of human intelligence, so at this time, strong artificial intelligence can be the status of the subject of civil law to engage in a variety of behaviours and bear the corresponding responsibility is the focus of the discussion. This paper will analyse the current situation of the development of artificial intelligence, its challenge to the civil law, its legal status of the debate, the feasibility of its legal subject status and the foreign legal regulation and judicial practice of the significance of China's legislation from five perspectives, to explore the types of legal attributes of artificial intelligence as a modern or future essential existence.

KEYWORDS

Artificial intelligence; legal subject status; civil capacity; civil rights capacity

CITE THIS PAPER

Zhen Dai, The Subjective Status of Artificial Intelligence in Civil Law. Science of Law Journal (2023) Vol. 2: 18-27. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/DOI: 10.23977/law.2023.020903.

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