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Contract Incentive, Transaction Cost and Contractual Conflict: An Empirical Study Based on Construction Project Management Contracting

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DOI: 10.23977/icpem.2019.004


Leiting Sun, Chunfa Li, Lijun Wang, Xianwei Xiong

Corresponding Author

Leiting Sun


CPMC (Construction Project Management Contracting) has a complex multi-party contract environment. In CPMC, high proprietary investment, institutional adjustment and other issues can easily lead to a series of contractual conflicts. In the perspective of contractual conflict, contract incentive provides formal reference condition for contract system, and transaction cost makes contractors produce opportunistic behavior. Both above conditions are the key influencing factors. Through the establishment of the relationship model and taking empirical research, we found that: contract incentive has negative influence on contractual conflict, transaction cost has positive influence on contractual conflict, contract incentive and transaction cost has negative influence on each other. Studying the relationship among contract incentive, transaction cost and contractual conflict, aims to discuss the deep-seated problems of project conflict governance. This research paradigm provides an effective project governance path to resolve contractual conflicts and improve compliance performance.


Contract incentive, transaction cost, contractual conflict, CPMC, project governance

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