Author(s)

Tang Yingtao

Corresponding Author

Tang Yingtao

ABSTRACT

Along with the continuing opening and reforming of the Chinese economic, the reform of incentive methods in state-owned enterprises had inevitably became an important topic for theoretical research. This research examines the extent to how the acquisition from state-owned enterprises cause the change in incentives methods during the recent economic period. We find support for the theory of state-owned enterprises: the SOEs prefer to maintain the centralized control of state-owned shares. Moreover, the incentives methods of those firms which was acquired turns conservative after the acquisition, which cancels or withholds the stock-based compensation plans. This research is carried through the case Shanghai Electric Group and THVOW Tech chosen from the recent acquisition cases in the China A-Share market.

KEYWORDS

Incentives, State-Owned Enterprises, Agency Theory, Share-Based Compensation