Author(s)

Wenwen Qi

Corresponding Author

Wenwen Qi

ABSTRACT

The principal-agent problem is often unavoidable, and a reasonable and effective compensation contract is the key to alleviate the principal-agent problem. Accounting information is an important basis for the design of compensation contract. Therefore, fair value information also has a certain impact on the formulation of compensation contract. Previous studies have shown that there is a correlation between changes in fair value and executive compensation contract, but there is also an asymmetry of "high reward and low penalty". This paper selects the data of A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2017 as samples to explore the correlation and asymmetry between fair value and executive compensation after the implementation of cas39, and the impact of equity incentive on the relationship between fair value measurement and executive compensation.

KEYWORDS

Executive compensation, fair value measurement, equity incentive, asymmetry