Multi Agent Participation in Renewable Energy Consumption Considering Evolutionary Game Theory
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DOI: 10.23977/EECTM2020.050
Author(s)
Yingying Wang, Ziqi Wang, Jun Xie and Jianzhong Dou
Corresponding Author
Ziqi Wang
ABSTRACT
Intermittence and randomness of renewable energy such as wind and light limit the consumption of renewable energy. Nowadays, with the development of many flexible resource technologies, such renewable energy is able to be used for peak shaving and frequency modulation, which makes it possible to utilize more renewable energy. After the formation of the power market pattern of "separation of power plant and power grid", many flexible resources participate in the game competition of main energy market and auxiliary service market at the same time. Under the condition of information disclosure, the traditional game theory makes the main agent achieve Nash equilibrium after a game, which is obviously not in line with the reality. Therefore, based on evolutionary game theory, this paper discusses the evolutionary stable equilibrium of traditional power generation enterprises, new energy enterprises and energy storage enterprises over time, which is called refined Nash equilibrium. Firstly, according to the replication dynamic equation, the evolutionary game model of renewable energy consumption is established. Then, the genetic algorithm is applied to the calculation of the proposed renewable energy consumption evolutionary game model. Finally, the effectiveness of the evolutionary game model is verified by using England 39 bus system.
KEYWORDS
Renewable energy consumption, flexible resources, evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stability strategy, replication dynamic equation