Author(s)

Yuxi Han

Corresponding Author

Yuxi Han

ABSTRACT

Financial supervision exists with the financial crisis. The main purpose of financial supervision is to prevent the financial crisis. Some people have vividly compared the relationship between them to “cat and mouse”. The purpose of bank capital supervision is to establish the business growth mode and resource allocation mode with capital constraint as the core, so as to realize the growth mechanism of coordinated benefit and risk and create a modern banking system with steady development. In the past, there were few empirical studies on the process of bank credit risk taking behavior in stages, and the selected indicators to measure credit risk and capital supervision level need to be enriched. In this paper, the main methods used to study the relationship between governance and risk-taking behavior of commercial banks in China under capital supervision are theoretical derivation and empirical test. The empirical analysis of the paper shows that: (1) For prior risk-taking propensity, the enhancement effect of leverage on bank risk behavior is more obvious when the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder in a joint-stock bank is higher. (2) For post asset risk, capital adequacy ratio and leverage ratio regulation have a more significant impact on G-SIFIs as equity concentration increases. Therefore, it is proposed that banks should continue to improve their internal governance structure, and regulators should implement differentiated supervision for different types of banks and strengthen leverage ratio supervision.

KEYWORDS

Capital regulation, Bank credit risk, Behavioral impact, Business data