Author(s)

Ziyu Wu ¹, Ping Yu ¹, Yixuan Guo ¹

Affiliation(s)

¹ Swinburne College, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Jinan, China

Corresponding Author

Ping Yu

ABSTRACT

The agricultural technological progress, along with agricultural mechanization and modernization, has given rise to the urgent requirement for large-scale farming. However, the contradictions between this requirement with the fragmented farmland and single-family production are becoming increasingly prominent. The confirmation of rural land contracting right and land transfer have provided institutional conveniences for large-scale farming. Nevertheless, the issue of "who will engage in farming ", that is, the cultivation of new-type agricultural business entities, is an urgent problem that needs to be addressed immediately. Given the inherent deficiencies of Chinese farmers in terms of funds, technology, management, and risk-bearing capacities, a"farmers + Agribusiness" sharecropping model is proposed, where both parties jointly assume the functions of a family farm.

KEYWORDS

New Agricultural Business Entities; Rural Land Property Rights; Sharecropping Contracts; Family Farms

CITE THIS PAPER

Ziyu Wu, Ping Yu, Yixuan Guo, Institutional Evolution of China's Rural Land Property Rights and Sharecropping Contracts. Agricultural & Forestry Economics and Management (2025) Vol. 8: 55-60. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/agrfem.2025.080108.

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