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The Legacy from the Past: Tradition of Revolution and Minority Shareholder Expropriation

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DOI: 10.23977/acccm.2025.070320 | Downloads: 15 | Views: 172

Author(s)

Yifan Peng 1, Hongmei Liu 1

Affiliation(s)

1 School of Accounting, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang, 550025, China

Corresponding Author

Yifan Peng

ABSTRACT

The tradition of revolution has not only exerted a profound impact on the Chinese development, but has also gradually permeated into the realm of modern corporate governance. We proposed that informal institutions, such as culture, can explain minority shareholder expropriation. Based on data from Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2022, we documented that inhibitory effects of tradition of revolution on corporate minority shareholder expropriation. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the baseline results is more pronounced in SOE and in firms where the CEO has been in post for a longer period of time. The findings expand the scope of cultural factors from a financial perspective, providing insights into the significance that Chinese government departments ascribe to the social governance functions of informal institutions.

KEYWORDS

Culture; Tradition of Revolution; Minority Shareholder Expropriation; Tunneling; Abnormal Related-Party Transactions; Governance

CITE THIS PAPER

Yifan Peng, Hongmei Liu, The Legacy from the Past: Tradition of Revolution and Minority Shareholder Expropriation. Accounting and Corporate Management (2025) Vol. 7: 146-153. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/acccm.2025.070320.

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