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A Study on the Expropriation Behavior under the Pledge of Controlling Shareholders' Equity: A Case Study of ST Xiangxue

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DOI: 10.23977/acccm.2025.070419 | Downloads: 1 | Views: 44

Author(s)

Mengyue Li 1

Affiliation(s)

1 Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou, Gansu Province, China

Corresponding Author

Mengyue Li

ABSTRACT

Equity pledges offer advantages such as flexibility, convenience, high financing efficiency, and low financing costs. Their increasingly widespread application in China's capital market has become one of the preferred financing methods for shareholders of listed companies. However, with the popularity of equity pledges, due to their low cost of encroachment and simple operation, controlling shareholders of listed companies may exploit equity pledges to pursue their own interests, thereby infringing on corporate benefits, harming the interests of minority shareholders, and affecting the healthy development of enterprises. Taking ST Xiangxue as an example, this paper investigates the equity pledge situation of Kunlun Investment, the controlling shareholder of ST Xiangxue, to explore the issue of interest encroachment in equity pledges. It analyzes the motivations, methods, and impacts of such encroachment, and proposes preventive measures. The study aims to provide references for regulating and supervising controlling shareholders' pledge behaviors, thereby promoting the orderly and stable development of the capital market.

KEYWORDS

Equity Pledge, Interest Infringement, ST Xiangxue

CITE THIS PAPER

Mengyue Li, A Study on the Expropriation Behavior under the Pledge of Controlling Shareholders' Equity: A Case Study of ST Xiangxue. Accounting and Corporate Management (2025) Vol. 7: 128-135. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/acccm.2025.070419.

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