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Research on the Definition of Relevant Markets in the Platform Economy Sector in the New Era

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DOI: 10.23977/acccm.2026.080110 | Downloads: 2 | Views: 89

Author(s)

Xinyang Wang 1

Affiliation(s)

1 Northwest University of Political Science and Law, Xi'an, China

Corresponding Author

Xinyang Wang

ABSTRACT

From the perspective of antitrust regulation in the platform economy, this paper analyzes the issue of relevant market definition. The study points out that the platform economy is characterized by multi-sided markets, indirect network effects, and "zero-price" models, which render the traditional price-centric SSNIP test impractical in real-world application. Moreover, splitting a two-sided market for definition purposes tends to overlook cross-side feedback effects, thereby affecting the assessment of market power. This paper further argues that transaction and non-transaction platforms should be distinguished based on their business models, and a differentiated definition approach should be adopted. Meanwhile, the theory of attention can be introduced to incorporate non-price competition factors into the SSNDQ analysis, thereby improving the precision and operability of relevant market definition. Overall, market definition in the platform economy should avoid mechanically applying traditional methods; instead, it must be dynamically adjusted in light of the characteristics of the digital economy and the analysis of competitive harm.

KEYWORDS

Platform economy; Market definition; Multi-sided market

CITE THIS PAPER

Xinyang Wang. Research on the Definition of Relevant Markets in the Platform Economy Sector in the New Era. Accounting and Corporate Management (2026). Vol. 8, No. 1, 70-78. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/acccm.2026.080110.

REFERENCES

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