Author(s)

Cheng Wei ¹, Yu Jiaman ¹, He Jianlong ¹

Affiliation(s)

¹ School of economics and management, Heilongjiang Bayi Agricultural University, Daqing, Heilongjiang province,China

Corresponding Author

Cheng Wei

ABSTRACT

Under the combined action of natural reproduction and economic reproduction, agricultural production process is confronted with a variety of risks intertwined with natural risk, social risk and economic risk. The emergence of agricultural insurance is only a matter of the last century, but it has become a financial tool commonly used by more than 100 countries in the world to regulate and control the economy, relieve the pressure of government relief, reduce the loss of agricultural disasters, and stabilize social relations. The development of agricultural insurance effectively alleviates the inherent weakness of agricultural insurance industry. The development of agricultural insurance market in the world is the result of various actions of the government. This paper mainly analyzes the supply and demand characteristics and equilibrium of agricultural insurance market in China from the perspective of government behavior.

KEYWORDS

Agricultural Insurance, Behavior Characteristics of Government, Environmental Characteristics

CITE THIS PAPER

Cheng Wei, Yu Jiaman, He Jianlong. Analysis of Supply and Demand Situation of Agricultural Insurance Market in China from the Perspective of Government Behavior. Agricultural & Forestry Economics and Management (2020) Vol. 3: 8-15. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/agrfem.2020.030102.

REFERENCES

[1] Cheng Wei, Li Dan. Analysis of Behavior Characteristics of the Main Body of Crop Insurance under Asymmetric Information Environmental Condition. EKOLOJI, 28(107): 3397-3403.
[2] Akerlof GA (1970) The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 84(3): 488-500.
[3] Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China (2018) Report on China’s 
Agricultural Development in 2017.Beijing. China Agricultural Publishing House.
[4] Vincent H. Smith,Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe. Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and 
Agricultural Chemical Use. 1996,78(2): 428-438.
[5] Myyra Sami, Pietola Kyosti. Testing for Moral Hazard and Ranking Farms by Their Inclination 
to Collect Crop Damage Compensations. Zurich: Switzerland. European Association of Agricultural Economists. 2011.

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