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Evolution and Equilibrium of Collaborative Innovation System of Low-Carbon Technology: Simulation of a Multi-stakeholders Game Model

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DOI: 10.23977/cpcs.2023.070105 | Downloads: 9 | Views: 413


Li Yanhong 1, Li Bohan 1


1 Institues of Economics and Administration, North China Electric Power University, No. 619, Yonghuabei Street, Lianchi District, Baoding, Hebei, 071003, China

Corresponding Author

Li Yanhong


Low-carbon technology innovation is different from ordinary technology research, which has high investment, high risk and great uncertainty. It is very hard for enterprises and research institutions to succeed independently, and almost impossible for them to cooperate actively. Due to the different objective of participants, the expectation of innovation is reflected in the initial collaborative intention, which is a pivotal factor influencing the stability of collaborative innovation. On the premise of bounded rationality, this paper constructs multiple stakeholders evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises and scientific institutions. The influence of initial strategy probabilities of three participants is analysed in detail through simulation. The findings are as follows: (1) The evolution of government strategy is not affected by the initial collaboration probabilities of enterprises and research institutions. Eventually government strategies evolve into stimulation and support. (2) The strategy evolution of enterprises and research institutions is significantly affected by the initial strategy probabilities of three participants. The higher the initial probability of government support, the higher the possibility of enterprises and scientific institutions participating in collaboration. At the same time, the initial collaboration probabilities of enterprises and research institutions have a significant impact on each other, and the higher initial collaboration probability of one participant, the higher the probability of the other participating in collaboration. (3) Through the scenario simulation of two extreme probabilities, it is found that enterprises, compared with research institutions, play a more decisive role in collaborative low-carbon technology innovation under the support of the government. Therefore, if the government wants to realize the low-carbon technology collaborative innovation, the essential point is to stimulate collaboration enthusiasm of enterprises.


Low-carbon technology, evolutionary game, collaborative innovation


Li Yanhong, Li Bohan, Evolution and Equilibrium of Collaborative Innovation System of Low-Carbon Technology: Simulation of a Multi-stakeholders Game Model. Computing, Performance and Communication Systems (2023) Vol. 7: 32-44. DOI:


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