Author(s)

Caichuan Wang ¹, Jiajun Li ², Yun He ³

Affiliation(s)

¹ School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, Shaanxi, China
² Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, Shaanxi, China
³ Hubei University of Automotive and Technology, Shiyan, Hubei, China

Corresponding Author

Jiajun Li

ABSTRACT

The cooperation between government and enterprises has continued to deepen, evolving from a traditional model to a new model. Now, the cooperation between the government and enterprises has shifted from simple resource exchange to an effective combination of more complex platform construction, system development, and other projects. The two sides would work together to complete the cooperation project on the basis of equal dialogue and consensus. This article focused on exploring how to establish a stable cooperation strategy between the government and enterprises, as well as the evolving relationship of government enterprise cooperation with equal status. This article adopted evolutionary game theory to construct a benchmark model for government enterprise cooperation based on stable strategies. Through research and analysis, it was found that the optimal evolutionary stable strategy point between the government and enterprises was (1,1). At this point, the government would choose to actively cooperate, and enterprises would choose to provide high-quality products or services. Finally, simulation methods were used to analyze the evolution of government led government enterprise cooperation and the results of equal cooperation between both parties. The result showed that the time required for government led government enterprise cooperation to reach stability was shorter than the time required for both parties to reach stability under equal conditions. Therefore, when enterprises engage in behaviors that are not in line with the public's interests, the government needs to use strong dominant behavior to increase the punishment of enterprises, in order to ensure project interests, safeguard public rights, and promote the stable progress of the project.

KEYWORDS

Government Enterprise Cooperation, ESG Concept, Stable Strategy, Benchmark Model

CITE THIS PAPER

Caichuan Wang, Jiajun Li, Yun He, Construction of a Benchmark Model for the Evolution of Government Enterprise Cooperation under the ESG Concept. Accounting and Corporate Management (2023) Vol. 5: 66-74. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/acccm.2023.051010.

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