A Study of Non-Controlling Major Shareholder Exit Threats and Corporate Internal Controls—Research on the regulatory effect of analysts attention
DOI: 10.23977/acccm.2023.051218 | Downloads: 25 | Views: 574
Author(s)
Miao Xiang 1, Yuhao Zhang 2
Affiliation(s)
1 College of Economics and Management, Hubei University for Nationalities, Enshi, 445000, China
2 School of Finance and Economics, Tibet University for Nationalities, Xianyang, 712000, China
Corresponding Author
Miao XiangABSTRACT
In recent years, the research theme of the withdrawal of non-controlling major shareholders and threatening to affect the internal governance environment of enterprises has gradually become an emerging research field. Non-controlled major shareholders exert "exit" pressure on the controlling shareholders of the enterprise to force them to give in to irregular behavior, which will have an impact on the internal governance environment of the enterprise. So can this impact ultimately affect the internal control quality of the enterprise? Therefore, from the perspective of the internal control quality of the enterprise, this paper studies whether the withdrawal threat of non-controlling major shareholders has a governance effect on the internal control quality of the enterprise, and further explores its regulatory effect on the above relationship based on the regulatory effect of analysts. Finally, through theoretical analysis and empirical research, it is found that the withdrawal threat of non-controlling major shareholders can improve the internal control quality of the enterprise; second, analysts are concerned about the relationship between the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders and the internal control quality of the enterprise.
KEYWORDS
Exit Threat; Internal control quality; Non-Control Major Shareholders; Analysts attentionCITE THIS PAPER
Miao Xiang, Yuhao Zhang, A Study of Non-Controlling Major Shareholder Exit Threats and Corporate Internal Controls—Research on the regulatory effect of analysts attention. Accounting and Corporate Management (2023) Vol. 5: 113-121. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/acccm.2023.051218.
REFERENCES
[1] Edmans A, Manso G. Governance through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2011, 24 (07): 2395-2428.
[2] Admati A R, Pfleiderer P. The Wall Street Walk and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2009 (22): 2645-2685.
[3] Edmans A, Fang V W, Zur E. The Effect of Liquidity on Governance[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2013, 26 (06): 1443-1482.
[4] Dou Y, Hope O K, Thomas W B, et al. Blockholder Exit Threats and Financial Reporting Quality[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2018, 35 (02):1004-1028.
[5] Chen, K.J. Exit Threats and Corporate Governance - Based on the Perspective of Surplus Management [J]. Financial Research, 2018, 44 (11): 18-32.
[6] Xie Zhen, Xiong Jinwu. Analyst attention and surplus management: an analysis of Chinese listed companies[J]. Finance and Trade Research, 2014, 25 (02): 139-149.
[7] Chen J, Ding R, Hou W, et al. Do Financial Analysts Perform a Monitoring Role in China? Evidence from Modified Audit Opinions[J]. Abacus, 2016, 52 (03): 473-500.
[8] Le A , Loo J , Luo Y ,et al. The impacts of internal threats towards Routing Protocol for Low power and lossy network performance[J].IEEE, 2013.DOI:10.1109/ISCC.2013.6755045.
[9] Li Chuntao, Song Min, Zhang Xuan. Analyst tracking and corporate surplus management-Evidence from Chinese listed companies[J]. Financial Research, 2014 (07): 124-139.
[10] Ling Shixian. Directors and Officers Liability Insurance and Internal Control Quality of Listed Companies[J]. Southern Finance, 2019 (08): 50-60.
[11] Cao Zhipeng, Gao Shishi. Exit Threats of Non-controlling Major Shareholders, Type II Agency Costs and Audit Quality: A Perspective on Shareholder Heterogeneity[J]. China Certified Public Accountants, 2021 (09): 22-27.
[12] Li Zhuangzhuang, Li Qiang. Exit Threat of Non-controlling Major Shareholders and Corporate Innovation[J]. Finance and Economics Monthly, 2020 (21): 38-45.
[13] K. J. Chen. Can the Threat of Exit by Noncontrolling Major Shareholders Reduce Corporate Agency Costs[J]. Nankai Management Review, 2019, 22(04): 161-175.
[14] Chen Fengxia, Wang Peipei. A Study on the Impact of Audit Opinions on Stock Price Synchronization-Analysis of the Moderating Effect Based on Analysts' Concerns[J]. Friends of Accounting,2022,(14).
[15] Oradi J, Asiaei K, Rezaee Z. CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses[J]. Corporate Governance An International Review, 2020, 28 (02): 119-140.
[16] Chen Kejing, Kang Yanling, Wan Qingqing, et al. Can Outside Major Shareholders Promote Corporate Innovation: An Empirical Analysis Based on the Perspective of Exit Threat[J]. Nankai Management Review, 2021, 02(03): 202-214.
Downloads: | 19881 |
---|---|
Visits: | 269335 |
Sponsors, Associates, and Links
-
Information Systems and Economics
-
Accounting, Auditing and Finance
-
Industrial Engineering and Innovation Management
-
Tourism Management and Technology Economy
-
Journal of Computational and Financial Econometrics
-
Financial Engineering and Risk Management
-
Social Security and Administration Management
-
Population, Resources & Environmental Economics
-
Statistics & Quantitative Economics
-
Agricultural & Forestry Economics and Management
-
Social Medicine and Health Management
-
Land Resource Management
-
Information, Library and Archival Science
-
Journal of Human Resource Development
-
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management
-
Operational Research and Cybernetics